U.S. Situation in Iraq could move in either direction

By Marilyn M. Brannan, Associate Editor

Unravelling The New World Order

April 12, 2004

The crisis that the U.S. military is currently facing in Iraq is the greatest it has faced since the fall of Baghdad a year ago.  The Sunni guerrillas that we thought had been defeated after the Ramadan offensive that occurred in October and November of 2003 are still functional, and it is likely they had a role in the barbaric attack against U.S. civilian contractors in Al Fallujah on March 31.  At this writing, Fallujah remains “near boiling,” but with a cease-fire of sorts in effect for the time being.  Guerrilla fighters continue to harass U.S. forces there and in Ar Ramadi, and U.S. casualties have continued to mount. 

Another unexpected development is the uprising of Shiite militia (estimated by some to number as high as 10,000) led by a firebrand/outlaw, Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.  These Shiites have launched an offensive in Baghdad and in a number of cities in Iraq’s southern region.  U.S. intelligence did not expect any of this.

Were we blindsided? Apparently, yes.  Two fundamental strategic assumptions made by U.S. planners proved to be faulty.  The first was that Sunni insurgency had deteriorated and would not be able to regenerate.  The second was that the U.S. had an understanding with the Shiite leadership that it would contain anti-American military action south of Baghdad; and further, they would not collaborate with the Sunnis.

The Sunni Part of the Equation

The fierce fighting and the level of casualties we have suffered in recent days is evidence the Sunni guerrillas are still viable.  Current U.S. efforts in the Al Fallujah-Ar Ramadi corridor of the Sunni Triangle are aimed at finding those responsible for the deaths and public mutilation of the four U.S. civilians on March 31.  One danger is that, if the siege of Al Fallujah drags on, the hostile Sunnis could potentially acquire sympathetic recruits in significant numbers, adding to the difficulty of putting down the insurgency.

Overall, the least threatening aspect of the current developments seems to be the Sunni part, despite the volatile situation around Fallujah.  If Sunni guerrillas have managed to regroup, it is disappointing that U.S. intelligence was unable to detect and pre-empt that reorganization.  However, there is a bright side: The guerrillas could easily have regrouped, undetected, if their numbers were relatively small.

Obviously, they have more sympathizers than actual fighting members, and a distinction needs to be made. Sympathizers can riot, but they do not pose the same level of threat as guerrilla warfare, which requires a higher degree of training, weapons and organization.  Protests and riots are distractions that create a strain on resources, but they do not significantly affect the ability of the U.S. to remain engaged in Iraq.

Another positive note is that the guerrilla warfare is drawing the guerrillas into the open where they are exposed to counteraction by U.S. and coalition forces.  This scenario can have either of two opposite outcomes: a very large guerrilla attack could potentially break the enemy, but it could also turn into a disaster for the guerrillas when they are exposed in large numbers to death or capture.

“The U.S. Marines west of Baghdad are not about to be broken,” Stratfor intelligence service maintains. “Therefore, if [U.S.] assumptions about the relative size of the guerrilla force and the high percentage that [has] been thrown into this operation [are] correct, this force will not be able to sustain the current level of operations much longer”

(The Stratfor Weekly intelligence review, April 8, 2004, “Gaming Out Iraq”).

On the other hand, if the guerrilla force is large enough to sustain such operations, then the failure of U.S. intelligence has been abysmal and would have serious implications for the success of our overall mission.

Shiite Threat

While a great deal of attention has been focused on Fallujah, some of the Shia have taken up arms against the U.S., spreading the war to the southern region of Iraq.  Even more of a surprise are reports of Sunni-Shiite collaboration in the Baghdad area.

Stratfor says it is the Shia, not the Sunnis, that represent the greater threat.  The critical question is:  Does al-Sadr’s uprising represent a fundamental shift in the Shiite community as a whole, or is it a small faction that has risen?

The U.S. command in Iraq believes that al-Sadr represents a marginal [more radical] movement that is at odds with the dominant Shiite leadership and is making a desperate attempt to change the internal dynamics of the Shiite community.

The “marginal” analysis pertaining to al-Sadr may or may not be true.  If Ali al-Sistani, the Grand Ayatollah of the Iraqi Shia, is genuinely opposed to al-Sadr, and finds it in his best interest to ultimately carry out his basic bargain with the U.S., things will be well for the Americans in the end.  If not, then the worst-case scenarios have to be taken seriously.

The Shiites suffered greatly under the regime of Saddam Hussein, which was dominated by the Sunni minority.  After the fall of Hussein, the uppermost priority of the Shia was to guarantee that a Sunni government would not re-emerge, and that the future of Iraq would be in the hands of the Shia majority.  This ambition is shared by the Shia in Iran, as well, who want to see a Shiite government established in order to secure Iran’s border with its historical enemy, Iraq.

It served the interests of both the U.S. and the Shiite elites to come to an agreement that the U.S. would guarantee the Shia a democratic government as long as the Shia maintained peace in the south.  It was not so much a collaboration between the U.S. and the Shiites as it was a mutually beneficial arrangement that allowed the U.S. freedom to deal with the belligerent Sunnis.  When the Sunni uprising of last fall subsided and the U.S. felt a decreased dependency on the Shia, the “arrangement” began to collapse.

Marathon Poker Game

The transfer of governing power to the Iraqis is scheduled to occur on June 30 of this year.  However, elections will not yet have taken place; and instead of an elected government, there will be a coalition government (made up of Shia, Kurds, Sunnis and other, smaller ethnic groups), structured to give all players a say in the future.  A general election would not occur until sometime in 2005—probably in January, if the current plan holds.

In other words, the Shia would not get a Shiite-dominated government on June 30.  As the reality of that fact began to emerge, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani began to agitate for direct elections to be held soon, knowing the Shia would easily win because of their greater numbers.  Washington argued there was not enough time to lay the groundwork for direct elections, but the Shia saw this as backpedaling by the U.S.  Al-Sistani has made it clear he doesn’t trust the transitional plan and doesn’t believe it protects Shiite interests.

While all this has been happening, there has been a significant change in Iranian politics, with a conservative government driving the would-be reformers out of power.  The U.S. has continued to hammer Iran’s government on questions of its nuclear program, its opposition to the Middle East peace process, its support of terrorist groups, and issues of human rights.  But Iranian leaders are not in a mood to be pushed, pointing out that the U.S. is “stuck in the mud in Iraq” and that they (Iran) can make matters much worse if they choose to do so. 

It appears Iran, which is 65 percent Shia, is already doing plenty to hamper the U.S. effort in Iraq: Members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps have been identified among the insurgents, and Iran has bankrolled al-Sadr to the tune of roughly $80 million. It is no secret that Iran funds Hezbollah, the world’s largest Shia terrorist group, to the tune of $100 million a year (The New York Post, April 12, 2004).

Thus, it serves the interests of both the Iranian Shiites and al-Sistani to embroil the U.S. in a very troublesome conflagration at this time.  Both wanted to make the point that they control power in Iraq and that the U.S. is there at the sufferance of the Shia.  However, they wanted to do it in a way that would not cause a complete rupture with Washington, which is, after all, instrumental to their long-term objectives.

Al-Sadr, it seems, was the perfect tool: dangerous but manageable.  In Stratfor’s opinion, al-Sistani could have dealt with al-Sadr at any time, but for the moment, it didn’t serve his purposes.  He wanted the Americans to consider the huge calamity they faced if they continued on the path to June 30 without modifying their plan for transfer of power.

Al-Sistani is holding the aces.  He will be helpful at such time as an understanding more congruent with his objectives is reached with the U.S.  At the same time, al-Sistani cannot allow al-Sadr to become too strong.  Al-Sistani will be as eager to liquidate al-Sadr’s movement as the United States—once Washington has modified its plans for postwar Iraq.

Calculating the Odds

If present trends continue, the U.S. military faces a very serious challenge, as they do not have the forces necessary to put down a broad-based Shiite rising and deal with the Sunni rebellion at the same time.  If the uprising goes beyond what can be practically contained, the outcome might be an enclave strategy, in which the U.S. concentrates its forces, perhaps excluding Iraqi nationals, and leaves the rest of the country to the guerrillas.  This seems very unlikely, as it would raise the question of why the United States would bother to remain in Iraq if its forces lacked the ability to exert effective force inside the country or beyond its borders.  The alternative under those conditions would be to withdraw, and that would be catastrophic for the overall strategy in the war against militant Islamists.  Obviously, the U.S. will do everything in its power to avert such a calamitous development.

Stratfor says the worst-case scenario is not likely to happen, for two reasons. The Sunni guerrillas currently at war with the U.S. military are not a long-term threat.  On the other hand, the Shia are a long-term threat, but their interests are not in war with the U.S. 

Al-Sistani wants a Shiite-dominated Iraq. After the events of the last week or so in Iraq, he is likely to get it, and Washington will not soon forget who “holds the cards” in Iraq.  However, the reality of a U.S. military presence in Iraq is long-term.  The forces there will stay at the sufferance of the Iraqi Shia.  The Shia know it, and they want the Americans to know it.  With the looming possibility of a U.S. offensive in Pakistan, the last thing the U.S. needs is to move more forces into Iraq.