Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States
Same deck, new hand–who’s the wild card?
By Marilyn M. Brannan, Assoc. Editor
Unravelling The New World Order

Since the beginning of the war in Iraq, the role of the United States has gone through several phases, with a rapidly changing kaleidoscope of ramifications for the nations directly involved.

First, there was the invasion of Iraq and the fall of Baghdad in the spring of 2003. The second was the phase in which the United States believed it would have a free hand in Iraq. That was short-lived, ending approximately July 1, 2003. The third phase was the period during which the U.S. and coalition forces engaged in intense combat with the Sunni guerrillas and collaborated with the Shia in Iraq and Iran, knowing it would be impossible to combat militant Sunnis and Shia at the same time.

The fourth phase—one might call it the “reality phase”—began in April this year with a negotiated settlement in Al Fallujah, and continued into the first week of June with the formation of the interim Iraqi government.

Rethinking Strategy
The new government evolved through a process that began during the April uprising by Muqtada al-Sadr in the South of Iraq. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s unwillingness to intervene to stop the fighting and kidnappings caused the Bush administration to rethink a strategic principle that had driven U.S. strategy in Iraq since July of last year: the assumption that the U.S. could not afford to alienate al-Sistani and the Shiite community.

Al-Sistani believed that by controlling the Shia during the Sunni offensive of October and November 2003, the Shia had won agreement from the U.S. that the sovereign government of Iraq would be largely controlled by the Shia. The fact of the matter was that by January of 2004, the U.S. was either backing off that agreement, or had not agreed to it in the first place. The interim government proposed by the U.S., with heavy Sunni and Kurdish representation, signaled to al-Sistani that he was not getting what he thought he had locked up—Shiite control and immediate elections.

Al-Sistani called for mass demonstrations in an effort to demonstrate that the U.S. was completely dependent on the Shia. When that did not work, he maneuvered al-Sadr into rising against the Americans while the Sunnis were launching an offensive west of Baghdad, principally in al Fallujah.

It appears Al-Sistani miscalculated. The U.S. did not conclude that it needed a deal with the Shia. Instead, it concluded that Al-Sistani and his chief channel of communication with Washington, Ahmed Chalabi, were completely undependable allies. By choosing to strike at a moment of extreme vulnerability for the U.S., al-Sistani undercut his advocates at the U.S. Defense Department that had argued in favor of alignment with the Shiites.

The CIA and the State Department, which had argued against Shiite alignment, now had a much stronger argument. Clearly, Al-Sistani was attempting to maneuver the U.S. into a position of dependency, with the only possible outcome being to surrender power to the Shia—whose interests lay with Iran, not with the United States.

This latest stage has the U.S. trying to maintain balanced relationships with both Sunnis and Shia, but tilting toward the Sunnis. A strategy that would have been unthinkable in the eight months prior to the battle for Al Fallujah had become a political necessity: the U.S. negotiated with its mortal enemy, the Sunnis, and ceded control of the city to them.

Al-Sistani has gone from being the linchpin of U.S. policy to being a competitor for U.S. favor—something he obviously did not anticipate. Concurrent with that dramatic turn-around—and probably no coincidence—was the very public discrediting of Ahmed Chalabi over the past few weeks, and the under-representation of Shia in the new Iraqi government, with no significant posts allotted to Al-Sistani supporters.

The U.S. has recognized that defeating a Sunni insurgence is impossible without being able to depend on the Shia to stabilize the south. Without sufficient military force in place to suppress both a Sunni and a Shiite uprising, and having lost all confidence in the Shiite leadership, the only logical alternative was to move toward ending the counter-insurgency. Early this month, Stratfor intelligence services published an analysis in which they outlined the reality the U.S. faces in dealing with the Sunnis and the Shia:

“That is a political process requiring the United States to recognize the guerrillas linked to the Saddam Hussein military and intelligence service as a significant political force in Iraq, and to use that relationship as a lever to control the Shia.”
(“Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia,” The Stratfor Weekly, 03 June 2004)

Whether we like it or not, that is the reality that evolved in Al Fallujah and manifested itself in the make-up of the interim government of Iraq. Prior to this latest development, the Shiites constituted the swing player in a three-man game. Now, the U.S. is attempting to maneuver itself into the more mobile role of wild card.

Iran and Saudi Arabia
The redefinition of roles in Iraq has major ramifications internationally. Iran, of course, has closely watched the situation in Iraq, and recognizing that the U.S. needed Iranian help against al Qaeda, has sought to define its relationship with the U.S. on its own terms.

But by April, the focus of the Bush administration had shifted to the deteriorating situation in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. had forced the Saudi government to crack down on al Qaeda, and now the radical Islamists were striking back.

Stratfor, in its June 3 analysis, made an interesting observation that indirectly addresses the outrage over “blood for oil” that has been the rallying cry among opponents of U.S. intervention in Iraq:

“Contrary to myth, the United States did not intervene in Iraq over oil—anyone looking at U.S. behavior over the past year can see the desultory efforts on behalf of the Iraqi oil industry—but the United States had to be concerned about the security of oil shipments from Saudi Arabia. If those were disrupted, the global economy would go reeling. . . . If those shipment points were damaged or became inaccessible, all hell would break loose in the global economy.”

(Americans who are up in arms over gasoline prices exceeding $2/gallon might want to consider the consequences of terrorists in control of oil supplies from the Middle East—a high-priority objective in the terrorists’ war against the West.)

Taking Saudi oil off the market was not acceptable. The Saudis could not stop shipping oil; they needed the income. However, for the first time since World War II, the potential for disruption of Saudi oil supply because of internal conflict or external force became a real threat, given the large Shiite population living around the oil shipment points.

The U.S. has not relented in demanding the Saudis cooperate on cracking down on al Qaeda. Thus, the Saudis find themselves trapped between the U.S. and their own radicals, both Wahabis and Shia. Facing both at the same time would be impossible; further, the Saudis know the U.S. might choose to stay neutral.

Meanwhile, the Iranians have their own axes to grind. They want a neutral or pro-Iranian Iraq to prevent another Iran-Iraq war. For this, they need a Shiite-dominated government. Their long-range goal is to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s relationship with the U.S. in Iraq is key to achieving those objectives. As relations between the U.S. and Iran became increasingly strained during the winter, the Saudis became more cooperative with the U.S., recognizing they were in danger of losing control as the pressures on them mounted.

Effect of U.S. Policy Shifts
The shift in U.S. policy has had two major aspects. The first concerned Iraq and our relationship with the Shiite leadership there. The second had to do with concerns about the security of oil shipments from Saudi Arabia if the Iranians encouraged a rising of the Shia in that kingdom. One cynical, but altogether pragmatic, aspect of the Saudis’ precarious position is that, ultimately, the survival of the House of Saud does not matter to the U.S.—except to the degree that it affects the availability of oil. The U.S. has to balance the pressure it puts on Saudi Arabia to deal with al Qaeda against the threat of oil disruption. Jerking the rug out from under the Iranians and the Shia in their quest for control in Iraq has been the U.S. answer—at least for the time being.

The degree to which the Iranians control the Iraqi Shiite leadership will soon become clear. The Iranians are not happy with shifting developments in Iraq, and the Shia in Iraq recognize they could find themselves trapped between Washington and Tehran.

The Iranians may get the Iraqi Shiite leadership to play their game; failing this, they may choose to become more aggressive. A third possibility is that the old rift between Iranian and Iraqi Shiites could emerge once more, especially if the Iranians see the Iraqi Shiites shifting back toward the American side of this complex and increasingly fluid poker game. Al-Sistani has tentatively endorsed the new Iraqi government, but he is clearly uneasy about the trend of events.

The big problem for the Americans is that the more complicated the politics of a war, the more difficult it is to prosecute the war. The politics of this war have become extremely complex. The U.S. must work to somehow simplify its war goals. As Stratfor analysts put it, “This is getting way too complicated.”

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